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Viewpoint

Beyond Pain—Controlling Suffering in
Laboratory Animals
BERNARD E. ROLLIN

lthough researchers have taken
steps to reduce the pain suffered
by experimental animals over the past
30 years, to reduce animal suffering
more comprehensively, they must
make a possibly harder change. They
will have to abandon what has become
the prevailing metaphysical outlook
of science—the view that only what is
reducible to physics and chemistry is
ultimately real. This change does not
necessitate abandoning reason. A welldeveloped, common-sense metaphysics first articulated over 2000 years ago
by Aristotle can accommodate enlightened science and a better understanding of suffering.
Undoubtedly, we have learned a lot
about pain in animals. In 1980, after my
colleagues and I had drafted what was
legally encoded as the 1985 amendments to the Animal Welfare Act—
which, among other things, mandated
pain control in laboratory animals—
we were asked by Congressman Henry
Waxman to prove that there was a
need for such a law. We did a literature
search on “research animal analgesia” and found nothing except for one
paper affirming that there ought to be
papers and another affirming that very
little was known (Rollin 2006a).
Also in that year, I was asked at
a conference to respond to a pain
researcher who claimed that the fact
of differing electrochemical activity in
the cerebral cortex of dogs from that
of humans showed that dogs could
not be said to feel pain in any sense we
could understand. I pointed out to him
that he did pain research on dogs and
from that extrapolated the results to
humans—so either his claim was false
or his life’s work was!
This scientist was expressing commitment to what I have called “the
http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org

common sense of science” or “scientific ideology,” a positivistic dogma
affirming that everything legitimately
part of science must be empirically
verifiable, or reducible to physics and
chemistry, and therefore talk of ethics
or animal consciousness is scientifically meaningless—merely an expression of emotion and not something on
which policy could be based (Rollin
2006b).
Two years ago, I redid my literature search on pain control in animals
and this time found 12,000 papers.
Certainly, things are far better than
they were. Physical pain, of the sort
subject to control by analgesics, is
no small thing. The pain-centered
approach to animal ethics is laudable,
but upon close examination, reveals
itself to be difficult if not impossible to implement. For example, it is
extremely difficult to see how one
weighs emotional pain against physical pain. An animal can suffer from
the threat of a beating as much as
from an actual beating. How does one
score the former in comparison to the
latter? How does one score fear? How
does one count the emotional pain of
a cow whose baby is removed from
her immediately upon birth when we
know that, under normal extensive
conditions, she will not wean the calf
for 7 to 9 months?
Enter metaphysics—that is, the view
of what reality is. Common sense finds
that objects in the world are qualitatively different—beautiful and ugly,
good and bad, green and yellow, hot
and cold, living and nonliving, wet
and dry. However, there are no words
in physics and chemistry to describe
the qualitative distinctions taken
for granted in ordinary experience.
The most articulate spokesperson

of common-sense metaphysics was
Aristotle, who saw reality as coextensive with the world of our experience,
something the scientific revolution
explicitly denied.
Unlike much of modern science, in
which the laws of physics and chemistry explain all phenomena, in Aristotle’s
world, each kind of thing obeyed its
unique set of laws. For Aristotle, all
things had a nature or unique function, which he called its telos—what
it did. Living things were naturally
explained by how they performed the
functions of living things; sensation,
locomotion, nutrition, reproduction—
all living things are characterized by
these functions but perform them in
unique ways. A predator such as a tiger
finds food and eats in a manner different from a herbivore’s. A bird moves
very differently from a snake. To know
an animal is to know its telos, which
we understand by observing numerous
instances of the kind of creature it is.
Therefore, we understand animals not
by reducing what they do to the laws
of physics but by observing how they
fulfill the functions of a living thing.
This is in no way unscientific but in
fact augments the scope of science to
cover what is essential to animal ethics
and common sense.
When we begin to think about animals in moral terms and about how
we manage them, the most important criterion is to respect their
telos. If we wish to assure animal
well-being, respect for the animals’
telos is as important as—and probably more important than—avoiding
physical pain. The pain of a surgical
procedure can be rendered tolerable
and minimized by the proper use of
analgesics. But the suffering engendered by keeping a social animal
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well-being of research animals and are
doing a good job controlling physical
pain, the next step is to make sure
the animals’ telos needs are respected
in the way in which they are kept.
Primates simply presented with food,
surely a very basic need, will often not
eat unless the food is randomly distributed in their cages, requiring foraging.
Many animals will withstand pain and
injury to escape severe confinement.
These examples illustrate that things
besides pain matter to animals; other
situations may be worse than physical
pain, and any telos violation creates a
negative experience.
Furthermore, there is no simple
word to express the many ways we
can hurt animals besides causing them
physical pain; the ways are as countless as possible telos violations. Positive
mattering—the many states that matter
to animals in a positive way—of course
would include all states that are positive for the animal: freedom of movement, pleasure, a sense of security,
companionship, and play.
We are morally obligated to expand
the scope of biological science so that
it studies all of the ways things can
matter in a positive or negative way
to animal well-being. We also need
to understand which forms of telos
violation matter most to animals, and
how. And we need to determine this
without harming the animals (e.g.,
by letting animals choose between
alternatives, which is a well-developed
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methodology known as preference
testing).
Replacing the notions of pleasure
and pain with that of telos and the
needs and interests flowing from it
creates major benefits. It helps us to
better understand our obligations to
animals. It stops us from imposing
harms as variegated as creating fear,
striking an animal, causing illness, and
engendering grief and loneliness on a
single axis—pain. It also fits with common sense, which has no difficulty
recognizing mental states in animals.
Finally, it rationalizes talking of happiness in animals, which means satisfying most (or all) of an animal’s needs
and interests arising from its telos.
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caged individually is not remedied by
drugs. The suffering resulting from
the 
separation of calf from cow at
1 day of age is not alleviated by narcotics. A clearer example is provided
by coyotes and wolves that are caught
in steel-jaw traps. These animals have
been known to chew off their paws in
order to escape. Because the physical
pain of being held in a trap is far less
horrendous than the pain of chewing
off one’s limb, we must conclude that
being kept immobilized is a far worse
experience than very severe physical
pain to the animal.
Ethologist Hal Markowitz and veterinarian Scott Line (1990) tell of a zoo
that built what was thought to be an
exemplary enclosure for servals (South
African bobcats). But the animals were
severely depressed. They learned that,
in nature, they ate by preying on lowflying birds. At the zoo, their food
was placed on the ground. They recommended that the zoo grind the
horsemeat they were fed into balls.
They further suggested that they use
a compressed-air gun to deliver the
rations, thereby accommodating the
servals’ telos. The animals’ behavior
changed immediately: They went from
lethargic and depressed to active and
engaged—and what we can presume
is happy.
Marmosets will bond as pairs for
life. Separating such a pair can often
lead to the death of one of the partners. Clearly, if we wish to assure the

